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very sensible and rational thing for marketeers to do. Why take chances if
you don't have to? Why not take the profit and leave the debts to others as
long as you can get away with it? "Nice work if you can get it," according to
the words of a popular song in the late 20th century, "and you can get it if you
try." T h e history of the 20th century would suggest that you can get it
without even trying, and this concept is also expressed by the title of a very
popular play and movie in the late 20th century.
T h e reader of this review is advised to read the book itself, which is a
pleasure to read and full of fascinating historical facts and insights, many of
which could not be included in this brief review. T h e reader might very well
come to a conclusion different from those of the author and this reviewer.
That's what history does best: challenge the human imagination! It is almost,
if not quite, like an ink blot, into which we can read our heart's desires.
Everyone should give it a try. Why let some of us determine what the rest of
us will think?
William Eckhardt

"SOCIAL SPECTROSCOPY"

AND ".LONG CYCLES"

George Modelski, ed., Exploring Long Cycles (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1987).
T h e first paper in this volume is by two of our members, Arthur Iberall
and David Wilkinson, "Dynamic Foundations for Complex Systems," and
needs to be considered separately from the others. It is mostly an attempt to
apply the laws of thermodynamics to civilizational processes. Its major
presentation is of a set of "spectroscopic" time scales, that is, proposed time
scales on which various human activities occur, and these are useful and
interesting ans general background knowledge. T h e smallest is one-tenth of
a second, and is the approximate reaction time that people have to outside
events, e.g. to the change of a traffic light while driving. T h e next eight range
from one second to 30-90 days in length and are also part of individual
human activity. Various others are longer, but only one, "200-1200 years," is
of specific application to problems of civilizational development, and since
this ranges over a whole order of magnitude its predicting power is limited.
T h e major weakness of this section is that in civilizational (as against
human-biological) terms it is almost entirely hypothetical; there is only one
single application to anything approaching a specific civilizational problem.
Even this single application is questionable. It concerns activity on the time
scale of 3-4 years (p. 31):
For instance, Grant (1985) discusses ninety-two Roman emperors and mentions
nearly one hundred others over the periodfrom 31 B.C. to 476 A.D., implying, as one
of many such illustrations, an average period ofpolitical rule of about two and one-half
to five years. This short average tenure suggests an implicit, underlying binary yearly
evaluation process with memory and involving weak decision making: Did our leader
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do well or not? Shall we continue our support or should we temper our support? The
frequent reiteration of that question is enough to account for the proverbial unease of
crowned heads, and the proverbial fickleness of public opinion.
It may well be that the conclusion is correct, but the datum in evidence is a
sum over a total of 507 years, and conditions varied enormously during this
period. T h u s for example the datum of an average reign of 2'A-5 years
conflates the Antonine Age (AD 98-192, five emperors not counting Lucius
Verus, for an average tenure of 18.8 years) with the military anarchy
(235-284, 23 recognized emperors, for an average tenure of 2.2 years, plus
15 regional claimants of the title, making 38 in all, for an average tenure of
1.3 years). It would require strong evidence to convince the community that
the same basic conditions obtained in these two periods, and no evidence at
all is presented.
A similar problem obscures the other major topic of this paper, an analysis
of the evolution of social science paradigms. This is mostly a refutation of
said paradigms from the viewpoint of a physical scientist, and is instructive in
that purpose. But again it tends to hypothesize without an adequate
exploration of example. For instance, it discusses the question of the place of
dialectical materialism in physical science (p. 51):
If dialectical materialism could have displaced any part of physics, it ought
immediately to have driven and quided the study offluid mechanics—the most obvious
potential physical application of dialectics. The modern study offluid mechanics can
very properly be said to have begun with Reynolds's studies of turbulence in the 1880s,
precisely in Engels's heyday, just in time to be guided by dialectical materialism, had
such guidance seemed fruitful. This did not occur. Surely one would then expect, at
minimum, that dialectical materialism would guide the study offluid mechanics in the
Soviet Union, the first and foremost institution ever committed to use dialectical
materialist metaphysics. We leave it to the reader to determine whether Engels or
Newton and statistical physics and Navier-Stokes have shaped the dei'elopment of
Soviet fluid mechanics.
This reviewer, as a historian, is totally unacquainted with any fluid
mechanics beyond those involved in washing dishes, but also, as a historian, is
experienced in examining questions. Fluid mechanics is held to be "the most
obvious potential physical application of dialectics": Beyond the point that
fluid mechanics was first formulated in the 1880s, why is it so obvious a
candidate for dialectical treatment? Was there ever any attempt at creating a
dialectically-oriented fluid mechanics, o r f o r that m a t t e r any
dialectically-oriented physical science? Presumably the Soviets have their
own answers for problems like this; where are they in this discussion? T h u s
in sum this paper is interesting in principle, and in particular is good
conditioning for minds too often buried in the minutiae of single specific
events. But it makes so little address of those single specific events that it is
extremely difficult for the historian to bridge the gap between his viewpoint
and that of the physicist, and such examples as are given need to be given in
much greater depth.
T h e remainder of this volume is a collection of essays revolving around the
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theory of "long cycles" propounded by George Modelski of the University of
Washington. This theory is outlined by Shumpei Kuraon in the paper
"Theory of Long Cycles Examined." It is two basic points. T h e first is that
long-lived state systems experience predictable cycles of order and disorder,
in which each cycle has four phases lasting some 25 to 30 years each: global
war ending in the establishment of hegemony under a world power; world
order imposed by the world power; delegitimation of the world power;
deconcentration of the world order, with consequent relapse back to global
war. T h e second is that these world powers enforce their position through
sea power, so these cycles are reflected in the degree of relative domination
of the sea by a single power. T h e proposed limitations of application of the
theory are quite clearly drawn, for example regarding the position of the
principal power during the period of world order (p. 197):
This "political basis" does not imply that world leadership is synonymous with world
control or world government. Rather, world power leadership is "a system for keeping
order at the global level in respect of overall security and global economic relations, but
not in respect of all national peculiarities of local administration."
T h e theory is drawn from study of the European state system during the last
500 years, for which the following analysis is proposed (p. 86):
There are some questions to be raised about various suggestions in this
model; Modelski himself notes that the primacy assigned to Portugal during
1518-1609 remains debatable. But even beyond that, this model makes no
note of even so drastic a conflict as the Thirty Years' War, which to all
practical purposes began right next to the Netherlands in the very first year
of the Netherlands' presumed primacy. T h e war of succession over the
duchy of Julich-Cleves (1609-1614) was an effort by the Netherlands and
others to prevent the Spanish Hapsburgs from seizing a commanding salient
that would dominate both the Netherlands and France, and one may suggest
that only the assassination of Henri IV of France prevented the outbreak of a
general European war at that moment.
Moving on to the comparativist interests of this Society, the first point to
note is that this model is drawn exclusively from the experience of a single
civilization, the West, and models drawn f r o m just one source are

FIGURE 1.
T h e Long Cycle in Western History
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notoriously chancy. T h e r e have been at least three other chronicled periods
in world history during which state systems involving multiple members
existed continuously for 500 years or more: China 722-221 BC, Greece
(expanding into Hellenistic Asia) 700-100 BC, and India 500-1600 AD. Of
these, China 722-221 BC has received an intensive analysis of the social
effects of warfare which happens to include a year-by-year study of the
number and size of wars occurring all through this period. T h e theory of
long cycles implies that state systems should show a distinct pattern of
intensity of warfare: 25-30 years of global, presumably therefore very
intense, warfare, followed by a sharp dropoff in intensity during 25-30 years
of hegemony by a world power, followed by a gradual increase of warfare
during the next 50-60 years of gradual decline of order, followed by a spike
returning the intensity level to that of global war. Figure II graphs this
intensity of warfare for ancient China, reflected in ten-year intervals. It
shows no obvious regularity. There is some tendency toward repeated
increases and decreases in intensity of warfare, but the pattern is a gradual
and interrupted fall followed by a gradual and interrupted rise, not a sudden
decline followed by a gradual rise, and shows no relation to the predicted
time-lengths of the long cycle. This it would seem that the theory of long
cycles is not confirmed by examination of the evolution of a state system in a
different civilization.

FIGURE 2.
"War Scores," by decade, Ancient China,
Chun-chi'iu Period (722-481 BC)
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"War Scores," by decade, Ancient China,
Chan-kuo Period (481-222 BC)
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Figure II. "War Scores", Ancient China, 722-221 BC, in ten-year intervals.
After Cho-yun Hsu, Ancient China in Transition, Stanford University Press,
1965.
T h e figure is in two parts, because Hsu periodized his data according to
tradition, into the Ch'un-ch-iu and Chan-kuo periods, (dividing in 481 BC).
This is a literary demarcation, based on the cut-off date of one particular
work (the Ch'un-ch'iu, the Spring and Autumn Annals of the State of Lu),
and has nothing to do with the subject under consideration. However,
speaking in general, "Chan Kuo wars not only lasted longer but took place on
a much larger scale than Ch'un Ch'iu conflicts"; one table notes the casualties
reportedly inflicted by Ch'in in various Chan-kuo batdes, and the figures
vary from 7,000 to 450,000, with seven of the eleven reported casualty totals
varying between 20,000 and 80,000 (three higher, one lower, with no
obvious pattern of growth or diminishment). "The 'war score' is calculated as
follows: In any single campaign each of the thirteen major powers
[Ch'un-ch'iu period] / seven major powers [Chan-kuo period] is computed as
one point, while each small state involved is computed as one-half point."
[Hsu 1965:56,64-57] T h e first two entries in the Chan-kuo graph come from
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Hsu's Ch'un-ch'iu figures, and so may be artificially high as compared to the
others. T h e last entry (of "10") covers only the two yers of Ch'in's final sweep
to empire; adjusted to the standard ten-year interval, this would be a
"50"—but then, there was no one left to fight with.

Looking next at individual papers, Modelski's "A System Model of the
Long Cycle" is a discussion of feedback patterns in a cyclical development
and David Rapkin's "World Leadership" outlines theoretical considerations
on that point. Both are interesting and should be examined by scholars
researching those subjects. T h e remaining papers are heavily oriented
toward economics, either using an economic model to analyze the
development of long cycles (George Modelski and William R. Thompson,
"Testing Cobweb Models of the Long Cycle") or using the long cycle model
to analyze economic developments (Daniel Pearson, "The Global Economic
O r d e r of the Eighteenth Century", Suzanne Y. Frederick, "The Instability of
Free Trade"). Pearson's paper in particular is an interesting comparison of
the predictions of long-cycle theory with those made by hegemonic-stability
theory, and should be read by all scholars who are creating and testing
models of civilizational development. Indeed, while Modelski insists on the
essentially separate though interacting nature of political and economic
events, the long-cycle model seems much more convincing on the
development of economic systems than it is on the problem of political order
and disorder, and theoreticians of macroeonomic development should
study it carefully. Overall, the book is recommended for university libraries
and for the personal shelves of scholars with the particular interests noted
above.
John K. Hard

CORRESPONDENCE
Reply by Modelski:
T h a n k you for letting me see your forthcoming review of Exploring
Long Cycles. It is a fair review. However, there is a point arising out of it,
and it is a basic one concerning the framework of the project, that needs
to be stated.
It has to do with how we view the evolution of the social organization of
mankind. I see it in McNeill's terms as the growth of one h u m a n community and not, as Toynbee saw it, as the rise of a multitude of distinct
civilizations. T h e long cycle, therefore, is not a process of "western
civilization" but rather that of a new era of the world system, the m o d e r n
era, one characteristic of which has been the formation, since about 1500,
of a global network whose functioning exhibits cyclical (as well as
evolutionary) features.
T h e m o d e r n world is structurally different f r o m the systems of the
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classical era in respect of size, complexity, and specialization. T h e classical world had no global network; hence it could not have had any cycles of
global politics. T h a t is why the theory does not predict any simple
correspondences and does not call for tests against classical experience.
I should therefore have p r e f e r r e d the label for Figure 1 to read " T h e
long cycle of the m o d e r n global political system" as it is on p. 86 f r o m
which you draw it. Better still, you might want to use the enclosed table
that is based on the more recent "evolutionary learning" model.
If I were to look at the Chinese case you cite, I might note that it is a
much simpler one, and relabel it a regional system. I would certainly
expect fluctuations to a p p e a r in its working, but looking at the structures
of leadership first, I would hesitate to draw conclusions solely from the
n u m b e r of actors participating in warfare. T h e dynamic involved is that
of the formation of a classical empire, and does not hold lessons for the
m o d e r n world.
Periodic Table of the Long Cycle of Global Politics
(learning mode)
Phases
Agenda-setting

Coalitioning

Macrodecision

I mplementatioi

global
problems

core
alliance

global
war

world power
challenger

1

1430
discoveries

1460
Burgundian
connection

1494
wars of Italy &
the Indian Ocean

1516
Portugal
Spain

2

1540
integration

1560
Calvinist
international

1580
Dutch-Spanish
wars

1609
Netherlands
France

3

1640
political
framework

1660
Anglo-Dutch
alliance

1688
Wars of the
G r a n d Alliance

1714
Britain I
France

4

1740
industrial
revolution

1763

1792
Wars of French
Revolution
& Napoleon

1815
Britain II
Germany

1

1850
knowledge
revolution

1873
Anglo-American
special relationship

1914
World Wars
I & II

1945
United States
(USSR)

2

1973
integration

2000
community of
democracies

2030

cycle

Based on: G. Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (1987).
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Surrebuttal by H o r d :
This emphasis on globalism makes three assumptions, first that the
world post-1500 was qualitatively different f r o m the world before 1500,
second that this difference was of such kind as to affect drastically the
interstate relations within the state system, a n d third that there were no
changes in size, complexity, and specialization after ca. 1500 that would
constitute another such structural change in the nature of the system.
This last looks particularly questionable; one may suggest that the world
of the later nineteenth century was much more evolved in terms of size,
complexity, and specialization than that of the eighteenth century, much
less the sixteenth century, and that a similarly major structural change
has occurred in o u r own times. 1500 is a traditional line of division in
Western history, but this is an American-centered tradition resting
primarily on that "in 1492 the world discovered us!" Globalization itself
was not a single event but a process that required centuries before
completion. T h e r e were other important developments at this time, such
as the printing press a n d the Protestant secession. T h e Peace of Augsb u r g in 1555 even affected the character of the Western political system.
But I am unaware of any developments that so changed the Western state
system as to introduce an entirely new mechanic into its workings. Modelski emphasizes sea power, but sea power had been working a r o u n d the
Mediterranean for at least eight centuries before this time, in an intensive
interaction a m o n g the Western, Byzantine, and Muslim civilizations.
O n e may note that 1500 was the effective date of the beginning of
colonialism, but only one of the European world wars was decided in the
colonies (the War of the American Revolution, decided by the battles of
Yorktown and the Saintes). Of course it may be that Modelski has justified these assumptions elsewhere.
Rejoinder by Modelski:
Let me say in reply that, in an evolutionary perspective, the basic break
between the classical a n d the m o d e r n world lies a r o u n d AD 1000; the
period between 1000 a n d 1500 might best be termed one of gestation of
the m o d e r n world system. T h e years a r o u n d 1500 are important because
they mark the birth (by a process of differentiation) of two new structures:
the nation-states and the global system, both based initially on Western
E u r o p e but not inherently "Western". What is called the "Western state
system" is the f amiliar nation-state system that arose at the same time and
as part of the same process of globalization.
T h e mechanism of globalization was oceanic seapower. T r u e , (coasthugging) sea-power was familiar in the Mediterranean and we must not
ignore the Indian Ocean a n d China seas either. But 1500 was a clean
break (in the West) between the earlier galleys and the new sailing ships
a r m e d with artillery and new navigational software, now circling the
globe (cf. Modelski & T h o m p s o n 1988, Sea Power in Global Politics 14941993). It does not mean the start of colonialism though; that too was
common in the Mediterranean for many centuries, most immediately
prior to that date in the practices of Genoa and Venice. In sum, while
1500 is not a "catastrophic fold line", it does mark the birth of two critical
m o d e r n structures.
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